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Controllers in Corporate Freezeouts 
Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Marcel Kahan 
An important element in the governance scheme of  a corporation  is its 
ownership structure. Most publicly traded companies in the United States 
have a dispersed ownership structure: no single shareholder owns suffi- 
cient shares to control the company. A substantial minority of companies, 
however, have a controlling shareholder.’ A controlling shareholder exer- 
cises powers that are available neither to the dispersed shareholders in a 
company without a controlling shareholder nor to the minority sharehold- 
ers in a company with a controlling shareholder. As the Delaware Supreme 
Court recently summarized, a controlling  shareholder can “(a) elect di- 
rectors; (b) cause a break-up of the corporation; (c) merge it with another 
company; (d) cash-out the public stockholders; (e) amend the certificate 
of incorporation; (f) sell all or substantially all of the corporate assets; or 
(g) otherwise alter materially the nature of the corporation and the public 
stockholders’ interests.”2 
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1. For example, Barclay and Holderness (1989) report that, in a randomly chosen sample 
of 394 publicly traded companies in 1986, 20 percent of the companies had a shareholder 
with a block exceeding 35 percent of equity. 
2. Purumount Communications  Inc.  v.  QVC Network Inc., 631 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994). 
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This paper focuses on one of these enumerated powers-the  power to 
cash out, or “freeze out,” the minority shareholders. Such freezeouts are ac- 
complished by a merger with a corporation wholly owned by the controlling 
shareholder. After the freezeout, the controlling  shareholder emerges as 
the sole equityholder of the company. In most states, mergers require the 
approval of the company’s board  of directors as well as of holders of a 
majority of outstanding shares.3 A shareholder who holds a majority of 
shares can effectively control both approval prongs and thus unilaterally 
set the price at which minority shareholders are frozen out (the “freezeout 
price”). The power to freeze out the minority shareholders on potentially 
unfavorable  terms  is  one of  several ways  through  which  a  controlling 
shareholder can derive benefits from control to the exclusion of, and at 
the expense of, the minority  shareholder^.^ 
While the power of the controlling shareholder to freeze out the minor- 
ity  shareholders  and to  set  the freezeout  price  is  unfettered,  minority 
shareholders have some remedies if they feel that the freezeout price has 
been set too low. First, they can seek a judicial appraisal of their shares, 
in which case they will receive the value of their shares as assessed by  the 
court (rather than the freezeout pri~e).~  Second, in some circumstances, 
minority  shareholders  can  seek judicial  review of the freezeout merger 
under the “entire fairness” standard, in which case the court will award 
them damages if the value of the minority shares, as assessed by the court, 
exceeds the freezeout price.6 While these two types of proceedings differ 
in certain  respects,  they both rely on a judicial assessment  of the value 
of minority  share~.~  Both types of proceedings can, in principle-if  the 
3. See, e.g.,  Delaware General  Corporation Law (Del. GCL), sec. 251; Revised  Model 
Business Corporation Act (RMBCA), sec. 11.03. 
4. In addition to freezeouts, a controlling shareholder can engage in self-dealing transac- 
tions with the controlled company, usurp corporate opportunities, structure the company’s 
dividend policy to fit her tax situation or cash-flow needs, or sell “control” to another share- 
holder. For formal models of sales of corporate control, see Bebchuk (1994) and Kahan 
(1 993). 
5. See, e.g., Del. GCL, sec. 262(b); RMBCA, sec. 13.02. 
6. See  Weinberger v.  UUe Inc.,  457 A.2d 701, 714-15  (Del. 1983) (discussing the entire 
fairness standard in freezeouts and its relations to appraisal rights); RMBCA, sec. 13.02(b) 
(remedies beyond appraisal rights are available if transaction is fraudulent or unlawful). At 
least in Delaware, a freezeout merger where the price is unilaterally set by the controlling 
shareholder appears to allow minority shareholders to bring an entire fairness action. See 
Cede & Co.  v.  Technicoloc Inc., C.A. Nos. 7129 and 8358, slip op. at 15, 16 (Del. Ch. Jan. 13, 
1987). rev’d on other grounds, 542 A.2d 1182 (Del. 1988) (appraisal is not an exclusive rem- 
edy where a breach of fiduciary duty is involved); Jedwub  v.  MGM Grund Hotels, Inc., 509 
A.2d  584,  594 (Del. Ch. 1986) (courts apply entire fairness standard when a controlling 
shareholder “effectuate[s] a transaction in which [it has] an interest that diverges from that 
of the corporation or the minority shareholders”). 
7. In general, the methodology for determining the value of minority shares is the same 
in entire fairness and appraisal proceedings. See Rosenblutt  v.  Getry Oil Co., 493 A.2d  929, 
940 (Del. 1985); but see Cede & Co. v.  Technicolov,  Inc., 634 A.2d 345,371 (Del. 1993) (noting 
that measure of loss under the entire fairness standard is “not necessarily” limited to the Adverse Selection in Corporate Freezeouts  249 
assessment is accurate-protect  minority shareholders from being denied 
the “no-freezeout value”-the  value that their shares would  have in the 
absence of the considered freezeout.* 
This paper identifies and analyzes a fundamental problem involved in 
the regulation of corporate freezeouts. When deciding whether to effect a 
freezeout, a controlling shareholder might take advantage of its private in- 
formation. When freezeouts take place under conditions of asymmetric in- 
formation, we  demonstrate, allowing controlling shareholders to effect a 
freezeout at a price equal or close to the pretransaction price of minority 
shares would enable controlling shareholders to effect such transactions on 
favorable terms and to extract in this way substantial private benefits of 
control. 
As this paper shows, courts face some difficult, inherent  problems in 
trying to reach an accurate assessment of the no-freezeout value. These 
problems arise from the fact that controllers, who decide whether to effect 
a  freezeout,  are also likely  to have  private information  concerning the 
firm’s value. As a result, the prefreezeout market price of minority shares, 
which is often used by courts in the assessment of the minority shares’ no- 
freezeout value, is likely to underestimate the no-freezeout value. 
Our analysis is organized as follows. Section 8.1 contains a short discus- 
sion of the use of market prices to assess the value of minority shares in 
freezeouts and a numerical example illustrating the adverse selection effect 
that results from such use. Section 8.2 contains a game-theoretic model 
demonstrating that, if a controlling shareholder can freeze out the minor- 
ity shareholders at the prefreezeout market price, that market  price will 
reflect the per share value of the company assuming that the controlling 
shareholder has the worst possible private information about the value of the 
company. A right to freeze out the minority shareholders at such a market 
price would therefore confer substantial profits on the controlling share- 
holder. The model uses several simplifying assumptions, but our work in 
progress (Bebchuk and Kahan 1999) suggests that its main result-that 
the presence of private information enables a controlling shareholder to 
gain systematically  at the expense of minority shareholders-holds  in a 
more general  setting. Section 8.3 provides a concluding  discussion that 
difference between the appraised value and the price offered in the merger since the chancel- 
lor has discretion to award rescissory damages if appropriate). 
8. There is  a large literature on whether providing minority shareholders in a freezeout 
with the no-freezeout value is enough or whether the standard to which  they are entitled 
should be higher. For example, in two classic articles, Brudney and Chirelstein (1974, 1978) 
argued that minority shareholders should be given the no-freezeout value plus a fraction of 
the gains created by  the freezeout. And Coates (1999) recently argued that minority share- 
holders in a freezeout should get their pro rata fraction of the company’s value-including 
their pro rata fraction of the controller’s existing private benefits of control. Our focus in this 
paper is on problems with the protection of minority shareholders that arise from problems 
of estimation, even if one assumes, as many courts do, that minority shareholders  are entitled 
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reports on some of the findings of our work in progress and considers the 
implications of our model for the controlling  shareholder’s incentive to 
pursue investment projects and to reveal information. 
8.1  The Use of Market Prices in Freezeouts 
For an economist, a natural approach in determining the value of the 
minority shares is to rely on the market price of those shares prior to the 
freezeout. Economists generally believe that market prices provide the best 
estimate of the value of a share that can be formed on the basis of publicly 
available information-or  at least a much better estimate than the one 
that a judge may arrive at after listening to conflicting, and undoubtedly 
self-serving, testimony of experts hired by the controlling and the minority 
shareholders. Indeed, several scholars have proposed  that courts use the 
market  price  as the measure  of  the  value  of  the minority  shares  in  a 
freeze~ut.~  And courts presently look at the market price as an important, 
although not the exclusive, factor in appraising minority shares.’O 
As we show below, however, there is a fundamental flaw in using market 
prices to measure the value of minority shares in a freezeout. The very 
power of a controlling shareholder to freeze out the minority shares-and 
to set the freezeout  price  equal to the prefreezeout  market price-will 
depress the prefreezeout market price of the minority shares. As a result, 
the prefreezeout market price of minority shares will be substantially below 
the expected “intrinsic” value of the minority shares absent a freezeout. ’ 
This is the case even if-in  fact, especially if-capital  markets are infor- 
mationally efficient and fully process  all publicly  available information. 
Thus, the prefreezeout market  price  is an unreliable  guide for courts in 
appraising minority shares. 
The reason  for the discrepancy between the market price and the ex- 
pected  “intrinsic”  value  of  the  minority  shares  is  that  the  controlling 
9. See Hermalin and Schwartz (1996), which presents a model not including asymmetric 
information and argues that awarding the prefreezeout market price in an appraisal proceed- 
ing creates efficient incentives to invest. 
10. For examples in which market value plays a significant role in valuation, see Genesco, 
Inc.  1,.  Scolaro, 871 S.W.2d 487 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993); McCuuley e  Tom McCauley & Son, 
Inc,, 124 P.2d 232 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986); Friedman v.  Beway Realty Corp., 638 N.Y.S.2d 399 
(Ct. App.  1995); In re  Glosser Brothen, 555 A.2d  129 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989); In re  Valuation 
of Common Stock of Libby, McNeiII& Libby, 406 A.2d 54 (Me. 1979); Clu>kel  v. First National 
Supermarkets, Inc.. 660 N.E.2d 644 (Mass. 1986); and Hernando Bank  L’.  Hufl 609 F.  Supp. 
1124 (N.D. Miss. 1985). Indeed, market value  is sometimes the most significant factor in 
determining fair value in appraising minority shares; see, e.g., Armstrong  v.  Marathon  Oil, 
513 N.E.2d  776 (Ohio  1987). Since U.S. courts consider the prefreezeout market price as 
only one of several possible factors determining the fair price, freezeout prices in the United 
States can and commonly do exceed the prefreezeout market price. Our model shows why it 
is sensible for courts not to give conclusive weight to the prefreezeout market price. 
11. We use the term expected  “intrinsic” value to refer to the expectcd value of minority 
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shareholder’s power to effect a freezeout creates an adverse selection effect 
that depresses the market price.12  A controlling shareholder will generally 
have private information about the value of the company that is not avail- 
able to the public. Absent the possibility of forcing a freezeout, such pri- 
vate information would cause the market price to be inaccurate but would 
not cause it to be systematically biased:I3 the market price may sometimes 
be too high or too low but would still constitute the best estimate of the 
value of the minority shares that can be formed on the basis of all public 
information. But, if the controlling  shareholder has the power to freeze 
out the minority shareholders by  paying  them the prefreezeout  market 
price, she will use that power strategically to effect a freezeout only if her 
private information indicates that the value of the minority shares is above 
their market price. This strategic use of the power to effect a freezeout re- 
sults in an adverse selection effect that causes the market price of minority 
shares to spiral downward. 
Assume, for example, that the per share value of XYZ Corporation can 
range from $100 to $200. On the basis of public information, any value 
in this range is equally likely. The expected “intrinsic”  value of a share 
of XYZ Corporation is thus $1 50. The controlling shareholder, however, 
knows the exact value of the company. The controlling  shareholder can 
freeze out the minority shareholders at the market price. If  she does not 
effect a freezeout, XYZ will be liquidated, and minority shareholders will 
receive their proportional interest. 
If a freezeout  were not possible,  the market  price  of  an XYZ share 
would be $1 50-the  value that the minority shareholders expect to receive 
on XYZ’s liquidation. Now, however, consider the effect of the power to 
effect a freezeout at the market price. To be in equilibrium,  the market 
price must be equal to the average amount that the minority shareholders 
receive  in  a  freezeout  or on  XYZ’s  liquidation.  Let  us  consider  first 
whether $150 can remain the equilibrium market price. At that price, the 
controlling  shareholder will  effect a freezeout if  she knows  that XYZ’s 
value is above $150 per share and will not effect a freezeout if she knows 
that the value of an XYZ share is below $150. Each possibility is equally 
12. See Akerlof (1970). Other commentators have also suggested that the market price for 
minority shares will be depressed. These commentators, however, intimate that the depressed 
price is  due to information  inefficiencies or to expectations of self-dealing (Brudney and 
Chirelstein 1974, 1978). By contrast, we show that the market price is depressed even if the 
market price is set in a rational expectations equilibrium and the controlling shareholder 
does not derive private control benefits from self-dealing or, for that matter, from uny source 
other than the power to freeze out the minority shares. 
13. Even absent a freezeout, the controlling shareholder can buy shares at the market price 
in a regular market transaction. Freezeouts, however, create greater possibility for insider 
trading. First, in a regular market transaction, the minority shareholders can protect them- 
selves by not selling, at least not at times when they suspect that the controlling shareholder 
has a lot of private information. Second, the controlling shareholder can buy only a limited 
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likely, and, in the latter case, the minority shareholders would expect to 
receive $125 on XYZ’s 1iq~idation.l~  The expected value of the minority 
shares (given the possibility of a freezeout) is $137.50 per share-and  $150 
is therefore not an equilibrium market price. 
Alas, for similar reasons, $137.50 is not an equilibrium market price 
either. The controlling shareholder will effect a freezeout if XYZ’s value is 
above  $137.50 per share (62.5 percent  probability),  and, if  there  is no 
freezeout, the minority shareholders expect to receive $1 18.75 on XYZ’s 
liquidation. The expected value of the minority shares is then $1 30.47 per 
share-and  $137.50 is not an equilibrium price. But, at a market price of 
$130.47, a freezeout will occur if XYZ’s value exceeds $1 30.47, and, absent 
a freezeout, minority shareholders expect to receive $1 15.24. The expected 
value of the minority shares is, thus, $125.83 per share ($130.47 X  69.53 
percent + $1 15.24 X 30.47 percent), and so on. 
Following this spiral downward, it turns out that the highest equilib- 
rium price is $100-the  lowest possible value of an XYZ share. For any 
market price above $100, minority shareholders will sometimes receive the 
market price (if the controlling shareholder knows that XYZ’s value ex- 
ceeds the market value) and sometimes less (if she knows that XYZ’s value 
is less than the market value)-meaning  that they receive, on average, less 
than the market price per share. As a consequence, no market price above 
$100 is an equilibrium. If the market price is $100, however, the controlling 
shareholder will always effect a freezeout (or be indifferent if XYZ’s value 
is exactly $100 per share), and minority shareholders always receive $100. 
As the example suggests, the power to freeze out the minority shares 
can be an important source of  private benefits that a controlling share- 
holder gains at the expense of minority shareholders. The ability to use 
private information to gain in a freezeout-and,  importantly, the market’s 
expectation  that  a controlling  shareholder will  use  private  information 
in this  fashion-generates  benefits in addition  to,  and independent  of, 
any private benefits that a controlling shareholder gains from self-dealing, 
salaries, etc. 
8.2  A Model of Freezeouts under Asymmetric Information 
8.2.1  The Framework of Analysis 
Shares of the company are held by  one controlling shareholder and a 
large number  of minority shareholders. Let  Y be the value of the com- 
pany’s equity and a < .5  be the fraction of  shares held by  the minority 
shareholders. Let n be the number of outstanding shares of the company. 
14. Since any per share value between $100 and $200 is equally likely, the expected value 
conditional on the value being below a certain level $2’ (with $X being between $100 and 
$200) is halfway between $2’ and $100. The expected value conditional on the value being 
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At t = 1, a minority shareholder has to sell one share for liquidity rea- 
sons. The sale (market) price is established by  an English auction among 
m bidders with  m 2 2, and P is the market price times the number  of 
outstanding shares. Bidders do not own any other shares of the company. 
Bidders do  not know the exact value of Y but do  know that Y is distributed 
in [ Y,,  YH] with an expected value of  At t = 1, the controlling share- 
holder derives private control benefits B 2 0 from her control. The aggre- 
gate expected value of the company to the controlling shareholder and the 
minority shareholders is thus  = r + B. 
At t = 2, the controlling shareholder receives a signal s regarding the 
value of  Yon the basis of  which the controlling shareholder forms 4 as 
an unbiased  estimate of  I.:  Without  loss of generality,  assume that  s is 
distributed in  [0, 11  with 4  2 7,  for  i > j.  In the “no possibility  of  a 
freezeout” case, no further action occurs at t = 2. In the “possibility of a 
freezeout” case, the controlling shareholder has the right to freeze out the 
minority shares by paying a freezeout price per share equal to the market 
value per share. 
At t = 3, Y becomes known, the company is liquidated, and Y is distrib- 
uted pro rata to its (then) shareholders. 
For simplicity, assume that the discount rate is zero, that all sharehold- 
ers are risk neutral, that there are no transaction costs in trading shares 
or effecting a freezeout, and that the value of B is known. Further assume 
that a freezeout has no effect on the values of  Y and B. 
8.2.2  The Value of Minority Shares in a Regime without Freezeouts 
PROPOSITION  1. If the controlling shareholder does not have the power to 
efSect a freezeout, the equilibrium market price of the minority shares is  r/ 
n; that is, P = 
PROOF.  The market price is set by bidders’ bidding strategies at t = 1. 
In an English auction with symmetric information, a bidder k’s strategy is 
defined by  xk,  the highest  amount the bidder is willing to bid  up to (if 
necessary) for one share. It is a dominant strategy for each bidder to set x 
to Yln. 
Let 1  be the highest x  chosen by all bidders other than bidder k.  Bidder 
k‘s payoff will depend on the values of  xk  and R. For any x, <  R, bidder k 
will lose the auction, and its payoff is zero. For xk  >  R, bidder k will win 
and purchase the share at A  + E,  with E having an infinitesimal positive 
value. For x, = 2, the winning bidder  is randomly determined;  that is, 
bidder k will either lose or purchase the share for A. 
For 1  < Fin, bidder k’s expected profits are maximized by purchasing 
the share at A  + E,  that  is, by  setting x, > R. For R  > Fln, bidder  k’s 
expected profits  are maximized by not purchasing  the share, that is, by 
setting xk  <  R. For R = r/n,  bidder k is indifferent between not purchasing 
the share and purchasing the share for rln and maximizes its profits by 
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The only value of xk  that maximizes bidder k’s profits in all three cases 
is xk  = r/n.  Any value x,  < r/n  fails to maximize bidder k’s profits for 
some R < r/n;  any value xk  > r/n  fails to maximize bidder k’s profits for 
some R > r/n.  Setting xk  = r/n  is, thus, the weakly dominant strategy 
for bidder k. By the same rationale, setting x = r/n  is the dominant strat- 
egy for any other bidder. 
8.2.3  The Value of Minority Shares in a Regime with Freezeouts 
If a freezeout is possible, the equilibrium market price is determined by 
the strategic interactions among the bidders and between the bidders and 
the controlling shareholder: 
PROPOSITION  2. The only set of  Nash equilibria in undominated strategies 
results in P = F,. 
PROOF.  The proof of proposition 2 follows from the following lemmas. 
LEMMA  1. The controlling shareholder has two dominant strategies  (with 
P  -  determined by the bidders’ strategies): (1) effect a freezeout ifand only if 
Y,  2  P; and (2)  effect a freezeout if and only ifF5  > P. 
The controlling shareholder’s expected profit from effecting a freezeout 
is FT  - P,  and the  controlling  shareholder’s  expected  profit  from  not 
effecting a freezeout is zero. For Ft >  P, the controlling shareholder maxi- 
mizes its expected profit by effecting a freezeout; for FA  < P, the control- 
ling shareholder maximizes its expected profit by not effecting a freezeout; 
for Fr  = P, the controlling shareholder is indifferent between effecting and 
not effecting a freezeout. Any other strategy is dominated by  these two 
strategies as they would entail either the possibility of effecting a freezeout 
when not effecting a freezeout maximizes expected profits or not effecting 
a freezeout when effecting a freezeout maximizes expected profits. 
LEMMA  -  2. For any bidder, setting x < F,/n is weakly dominated by setting 
x = Y,/n. 
Bidder k’s  bid matters to bidder k only if  the controlling  shareholder 
does  not effect a freezeout  and if  xk 2 R.  (Otherwise,  bidder  k  makes 
profits of zero regardless of its bid.) Assume, therefore, that R 5 F,,/n and 
that the controlling shareholder does not effect a freezeout. 
If  R = YJn, setting  xk = FJn means  that  bidder  k will  sometimes 
buy  -  a share for FJn. The payoff from buying  a share for T,/n is  Y/n - 
Y,/n 2 0 and thus dominates the payoff from setting xk  < Fo/n  and not 
buying a share (which is always zero). (Recall that, in assessing the domi- 
nance of strategies, one does not assume that the controlling shareholder 
plays its dominant strategy.) 
If  R < FJn, setting x, >  R  means that bidder k will buy a share for R + 
E, with  a payoff of  Y/n -  (R  + E) > 0. This payoff dominates the pay- 
off from setting x,  5 R.  Setting x = F,,/n thus weakly dominates setting 
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LEMMA  3. If the controlling shareholder plays one of  its dominant strute- 
If the controlling shareholder plays one of its dominant strategies, the 
gies, no strategy of  bidders that results in P > yo  is a Nash equilibrium. 
payoff to the winning bidder is 
{prob(F 2  P) x  P +  prob(E  <  P)  x  E[YlT <  PI  - P}/n 
This payoff is negative since E[  ll Y,  < PI  <  l?  The winning bidder would 
thus prefer to lower its bid to below i  (with a payoff of zero). The strate- 
gies are therefore not in Nash equilibrium. 
LEMMA  4. The following strategy profiles are Nash equilibria: (1)  each 
bidder sets x = Lo/n,  and the controlling shareholder eflects a ,  freezeout if 
and only if r,  2  P; and (2)  each bidder sets x = FJn, and the controlling 
shareholder efSects a freezeout if and only if r, > P. 
Both of these Nash equilibria result in P = Fo. 
The controlling shareholder cannot profit from changing her strategy 
since she plays a dominant strategy. Since either a freezeout is effected or 
s = 0, all bidders make zero expected profits. No bidder can thus profit 
from reducing his bid. No bidder can profit from raising his bid  since 
raising one’s bid results in P > Yo,  with a negative expected payoff to the 
winning bidder (lemma 3). 
Lemmas 1-3  show that the strategies of the bidders and of the control- 
ling shareholder are undominated. 
It should be noted that there are an infinite number of Nash equilibrium 
strategies with the features  of (i) P < yo  and (ii) the controlling  share- 
holder always effecting a freezeout. (In fact, any combination of strategies 
with these features is in Nash equilibrium.) The strategies resulting in such 
Nash equilibria, however, are not undominated. 
Remark. The intuition behind the result that the equilibrium market price 
will be equal to the worst possible expected value of the company given 
the controlling  shareholder’s set of potential signals lies in the adverse 
selection effect of the freezeout power. The minority shareholders receive 
the market price if a freezeout takes place at t = 2. If no freezeout takes 
place at t = 2, the minority shareholders can deduce that, given the infor- 
mation available to the controlling shareholder, the value of the minority 
shares is below their market price; therefore, they would expect to receive 
less than the market price. (They never expect to receive more than the 
market price.) Thus, if the market price is sufficiently high that the control- 
ling shareholder will sometimes not pursue a freezeout, the amount that 
the minority shareholders expect to receive is below the market price. No 
such price can be in equilibrium at t = 1. On the other hand, no price 
below the expected value of the company if  the controlling shareholder 
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minority shareholders expect to receive at least this amount whether or 
not a freezeout takes place. 
The degree to which Lo-the  expected value of the company assuming 
that the private information of the controlling  shareholder is the worst 
possible-differs  from Y-the  expected value of the company absent pri- 
vate information-depends  on the strength of the signal received. In one 
extreme case, where the signal reveals the actual value of  the company 
(L, =  Y),  the equilibrium  price drops to  Y,.  In another extreme case, 
where the signal conveys no information (Yo  = Y, = Y),  the equilibrium 
price is equal to F. 
Rather than by  the absolute level of private information, however, the 
market price is determined by  the extent to which the controlling share- 
holder  has private information regarding elements that have an adverse 
effect on the company’s value-that  is, elements that drive down the value 
of Lo  (even if they do not affect any other FA).  In other words, the market 
price  falls with (and the controlling  shareholder benefits from) a more 
accurate signal only if the signal is negative, not if the signal is positive. 
In the extreme,  it is sufficient to have the market price drop to  Y, (the 
lowest possible value of the company) if  the controlling shareholder re- 
ceives a binary signal: a perfectly accurate signal indicating that the com- 
pany’s value is  Y, and a highly imprecise signal indicating only that the 
company’s value is not Y,. 
8.2.4  The Effect of Freezeouts on Private Control Benefits 
On the basis of propositions  1 and 2,  we  can calculate the respective 
equilibrium  values  of the minority shares  and the control  block  in the 
absence and the presence of the possibility of a freezeout. 
In a regime without freezeouts, the aggregate expected value of the mi- 
nority shares is 
- 
ay  , 
and the expected value of the control block (at t = 1) will be 
(1 - a)Y +  B. 
Relative to the respective pro rata fraction of v,  the value of the minority 
shares is 
and the value of the control block is 
(I - a)v  +  aB. 
With the possibility of a freezeout, the value of the minority shares is Adverse Selection in Corporate Freezeouts  257 
- 
ay,  3 
and the expected value of the control block (at t = 1) is 
(1 - a)F +  a(Y - c)  +  B. 
Relative to the respective pro rata fraction of v,  the value of the minority 
shares is 
aV-  a@-  c)-  aB, 
and the value of the control block is 
(1 - a)v  +  a(Y - c)  +  aB. 
Thus, as a result of the possibility of a freezeout, the value of the minor- 
ity shares decreases by 
a(Y - y,), 
and the value of the control block increases by  the same corresponding 
amount. 
The expression a(r - Yo)  represents the expected value (at t = 1) of 
the amount that the controlling shareholder can divert from the minority 
shareholders by the strategic exercise of the freezeout option. This adds 
to other sources of private control benefits (B), 
8.3  Concluding Discussion 
In this  paper,  we  presented  a  simple model  of  corporate  freezeouts 
where the controlling shareholder has the option to pay the prefreezeout 
market price to the minority shareholders. We have shown that this option 
has substantial value to the controlling shareholder when she has private 
information about the value of the company. Our work in progress prelimi- 
narily indicates that  the results of the simple model discussed here are 
robust to several variations of the model that render the model more com- 
plex and more general. In particular, we  analyze freezeout pricing rules 
where the freezeout price is not, or not exclusively, determined by the pre- 
freezeout market price, we examine the case where the freezeout produces 
efficiency  gains  and losses (i.e., increases  or decreases  the  company’s 
value), and we  extend the analysis to multiple periods where, in each pe- 
riod, new private information becomes available to the controlling share- 
holder and prior private information becomes available to the market. Al- 
though the specific results derived for the value of the minority shares and 
the control block vary with each of these extensions, the general result of 
the model-that  the freezeout option can be highly valuable to the con- 
trolling shareholder-continues  to hold. 258  Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Marcel Kahan 
The fact that the freezeout option is valuable,  and that the per share 
value of the minority  shares is below the per share value of the control 
block,  has  important policy  implications.  First,  since the  value  of  the 
freezeout option depends on the extent of the controlling  shareholder’s 
private  information,  a  controlling  shareholder  has  excessive incentives 
(from  the  social  perspective)  to obtain private  information  or, equiva- 
lently, to obtain information earlier than the market. Since obtaining pri- 
vate information is costly, a controlling shareholder will expend excessive 
resources on acquiring information. 
Second, once  private  information  is  obtained,  the controlling  share- 
holder  has  excessive incentives  to withhold  such  information  from  the 
market. These incentives result in social losses to the extent that it is so- 
cially desirable to have a more informed market and to the extent that the 
controlling shareholder expends resources in actively hiding information. 
Third, the desire to obtain private  information skews the investments 
that the controlling shareholder would have the company undertake. Dif- 
ferent investment projects provide the controlling shareholder with differ- 
ent levels of private information, and the controlling shareholder has an 
incentive to choose investment projects that yield greater private informa- 
tion even if the projects have a negative net present value. Moreover, as 
explained  before, private  information  related to adverse developments is 
particularly valuable. Thus, a controlling shareholder has an incentive to 
have the company invest in projects that potentially (a)  have a substantial 
downside and (h)  supply the controlling shareholder with private informa- 
tion regarding whether that downside is realized. 
Finally, the presence of private control benefits (of any sort) means that 
a party has a socially excessive incentive to become (or remain) a control- 
ling shareholder. This excessive incentive results in social losses of  two 
types: the transaction costs incurred in assembling a control block of shares 
and the reduction in diversification  benefits due to the fact that one may 
have to hold an undiversified portfolio in order to hold a control block in 
a company. Additionally, any source of private control benefits is of con- 
cern if a goal of the legal system is to ensure that all shareholders partici- 
pate proportionally in the value of the company. 
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Comment  Paul G. Mahoney 
A fundamental problem in corporate law is how to constrain a controlling 
shareholder from using control to appropriate the full value of the firm. 
One simple method of appropriation is to “freeze out” the minority share- 
holders  by  merging  the firm into one wholly owned by  the controlling 
shareholder.  Because the controlling  shareholder has sufficient votes to 
approve the merger over the minority’s objections, it can cause the merger 
to occur at any price it wishes. Various features of corporate law try to 
assure that this price is “fair” to the minority. 
It is tempting to say that the best measure of the fair price is the market 
price of the shares prior to the merger. As Bebchuk and Kahan note, how- 
ever, this does not account for the information content of the majority’s 
desire to freeze out the minority. The majority can gain from implement- 
ing a freezeout whenever  it has private information  indicating  that  the 
current market value of the firm is too low. Therefore, Bebchuk and Kahan 
argue, the majority’s failure to freeze out demonstrates that the value indi- 
cated by the private signal is less than or  equal to the market price. Rational 
shareholders will draw an adverse inference and revalue the shares down- 
ward until either the majority effects a freezeout or  the shares’ value reaches 
the bottom of the possible range of the majority’s privately known valu- 
ation. 
Bebchuk  and Kahan argue  that  this  adverse  selection  problem  has 
implications for legal policy. For example, it might justify judges’ long- 
standing reluctance to recognize market prices as the best measure of the 
fair price in a freezeout context. More important, however, the paper im- 
plicitly challenges lawyers and economists to identify the institutional fea- 
tures of real-world corporations that lead to results contrary to those of 
the model. Freezeouts cannot have the consequences for real firms that 
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they  have in  Bebchuk  and Kahan’s model.  If  they  did, equity markets 
could not exist where freezeouts are permissible. 
In Bebchuk and Kahan’s model, shareholders know that the entrepre- 
neudmajority shareholder will receive a private signal regarding the firm’s 
value, that there is a determinate lower bound to that value, and that the 
majority  has only one opportunity to implement a freezeout (which as- 
sures that the majority’s failure to freeze out at that time is a reflection 
of private information rather than a strategic delay meant to mislead the 
minority). Under those circumstances, rational shareholders will not pay 
more than the lower bound (Yo)  if freezeouts are permissible. As a result, 
the claim held by a “shareholder” is really a bond with a face value of Yo 
and a perpetual  maturity.  If we  make the lower bound stochastic rather 
than determinate,  then  shareholders  will  not  pay more than the lowest 
possible value of the relevant distribution, and, recursively, we end up with 
either a debt claim or a claim worth nothing at all. In short, firms with a 
shareholder who owns more than 50 percent but less than 100 percent of 
the equity could not exist. 
This is not what we  observe. Some features of the institutional land- 
scape-legal  rules, extralegal norms, contractual innovations, or all of the 
above-have  made concentrated ownership possible. Although Bebchuk 
and Kahan do not ask what these institutional features are, their identifi- 
cation is a critical issue for those studying corporate governance. Holder- 
ness and Sheehan (chap. 5 in this volume) argue by process of elimination 
that legal constraints (particularly the fiduciary duties required of major- 
ity shareholders) are important, noting shareholders’ disinclination to in- 
sist on explicit contractual protections. 
We might also gain some insight by noting that the freezeout puzzle is 
a mirror image of the new-issue puzzle. A new issue of stock creates an 
adverse selection problem because the majority’s desire to sell is evidence 
that the offering price is too high, just as the majority’s desire to buy in 
a freezeout is evidence that the freezeout price is too low. By analogy to 
Bebchuk and Kahan’s model, new issues should not sell at any price greater 
than the lowest possible valuation of the firm-presumably  zero for real- 
world firms. 
Loughran and Ritter (1995) present evidence that new issues (both ini- 
tial public offerings and seasoned equity offerings) earn unexpectedly low 
long-term returns. Behavioral finance theorists might see this as evidence 
that purchasers are overly optimistic. Similarly, one might try to explain 
the  failure of firms with concentrated ownership to trade at a discount to 
firms with diffuse ownership as evidence of overoptimism. If we  accept 
these views, the existence of large public equity markets is a consequence 
of cognitive error. 
An alternative perspective on new issues is that investment bankers act 
as information intermediaries, putting their reputation on the line to sig- 
nal  investors  that  the price  is not too high.  This provides  still another Adverse Selection in Corporate Freezeouts  261 
avenue to explore in the case of freezeouts. Investment bankers act as in- 
formation intermediaries, thereby giving fairness opinions. Although law- 
yers tend to view fairness opinions as a formality that protects directors 
against fiduciary liability, they also put the banker’s reputation behind the 
claim that the price is not too low. 
I would have preferred that Bebchuk and Kahan address explicitly the 
divergence between observed behavior and the predictions of the model. 
The paper does, however, provide an excellent starting point for future 
discussion of the problem of freezeouts and the legal and contractual re- 
sponses. 
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